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Abstract
An approach to the revision of logic programs under the answer set semantics is presented.
For programs P and Q, the goal is to determine the answer sets that correspond to the
revision of P by Q, denoted P ∗Q. A fundamental principle of classical (AGM) revision,
and the one that guides the approach here, is the success postulate. In AGM revision, this
stipulates that α ∈ K ∗ α. By analogy with the success postulate, for programs P and Q,
this means that the answer sets of Q will in some sense be contained in those of P ∗ Q.
The essential idea is that for P ∗Q, a three-valued answer set for Q, consisting of positive
and negative literals, is first determined. The positive literals constitute a regular answer
set, while the negated literals make up a minimal set of naf literals required to produce
the answer set from Q. These literals are propagated to the program P , along with those
rules of Q that are not decided by these literals. The approach differs from work in update
logic programs in two main respects. First, we ensure that the revising logic program has
higher priority, and so we satisfy the success postulate; second, for the preference implicit
in a revision P ∗Q, the program Q as a whole takes precedence over P , unlike update logic
programs, since answer sets of Q are propagated to P . We show that a core group of the
AGM postulates are satisfied, as are the postulates that have been proposed for update
logic programs.
KEYWORDS: Answer set programming, belief change, belief revision
1 Introduction
Answer set programming (ASP) (Baral 2003) has proven to be well-suited to prob-
lems in knowledge representation and reasoning (KR). The advent of efficient
provers (Simons et al. 2002; Leone et al. 2006; Gebser et al. 2007) has led to the
successful application of ASP in both KR and constraint satisfaction problems.
However, an important consideration is that in any nontrivial domain, an agent’s
knowledge of the domain will almost certainly be incomplete or inaccurate, or it
may become out of date as the domain evolves. Thus, over time an agent will need
to adjust its knowledge after receiving new information concerning the domain.
In ASP there has been a substantial effort in developing approaches to updating
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a knowledge base, where a knowledge base is expressed as a logic program under
the answer set semantics. In general, one is given a sequence of logic programs
(P1, . . . , Pn) where informally rules in Pi in some fashion or other take precedence
over rules in Pj for j < i. However, it isn’t clear that such approaches capture a
notion of revision or update of logic programs, so much as they capture a notion of
priority or preference between rules in a program. Thus such approaches generally
fail to satisfy properties that would be expected to hold for revision in classical
logic. Part of the reason is that revision appears to be intrinsically more difficult
in a nonmonotonic setting (such as in ASP) than in a monotonic one, such as in
classical logic. We also suggest that part of the problem is that extant approaches
enforce a notion of priority at the level of the individual rule; instead we propose
that the notion of priority given in a revision is a program level notion, in that for
a revision specified as P1 ∗ P2, program P2 taken as a whole has priority over P1.
In this paper, an approach to the revision of logic programs is presented. A
major goal is to investigate the extent to which AGM-style revision is compatible
with an extended logic programming framework. A logic program is regarded as a
representation of an agent’s epistemic state, while the corresponding answer sets
are taken as representing the agent’s beliefs. The approach describes revision, in
that the postulate of success is adhered to; the idea is that for a revision of P1 by
P2, beliefs (viz. elements of an answer set) given by P2 should overrule those in
P1. This is carried out by first determining 3-valued answer sets of P2. Each such
answer set is a pair (X+, X−), where X+ is a regular answer set of P2, and X
− is
a minimum set of negation as failure literals necessary to produce the answer set
X+. The information in each such 3-valued answer set, together with the rules of
P2 not used in the definition of the answer set, and along with the program P1, is
used to define an answer set (or answer sets) of P1 ∗ P2.
The assumption of success leads to an approach with a different emphasis from
previous approaches. In particular, for the revision of P1 by P2, the program P2 is
treated as having higher priority than the program P1; this is in contrast with pre-
vious work, wherein the rules in P2 are treated as having higher priority than (some
or all of) the rules in P1. We suggest that this distinction separates approaches ad-
dressing priorities in logic programs from revision. As well, it leads to an approach
with better properties than earlier work. For example, the approach is syntax in-
dependent, in that if two programs are strongly equivalent, then they behave the
same with respect to revision. As well, a prototype has been implemented.
We argue that this approach is an appropriate interpretation for a notion of
revision in logic programs. Furthermore, the approach may be applied in cases
where a problem is expressed as a sequence of NP-complete problems; for example,
it allows the natural specification of a problem in which a 3-colouring of a graph is
to be found, followed by a Hamiltonian path among the yellow vertices. We discuss
these issues in more detail in the next section, after formal preliminaries have been
presented. After this, intuitions are given, and the following section presents the
formal details and properties of the approach. We conclude with a discussion that
includes the applicability of the approach and future work. Proofs are for the most
part straightforward, and are abbreviated due to space constraints.
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2 Background
2.1 Formal Preliminaries
Our language is built from a finite set of atoms P = {a, b, . . .}. A literal is an atom
a or its negation ¬a; L is the set of literals. For a set X of literals, not(X) = {not a |
a ∈ X}. For a literal l, not l is sometimes referred to as a naf (negation as failure)
literal or weakly negated literal. For l ∈ L, atom(l) is the atom corresponding to l;
for a set X of literals, atom(X) = {atom(l) | l ∈ X}. A rule r is of the form
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln, not Ln+1, . . . , not Lm (1)
where L0, . . . , Lm are literals and 0 ≤ n ≤ m. If n = m then r is positive. If
m = 0, then r is called a fact. We also allow the situation where L0 is absent, in
which case we denote the head by ⊥; and r is called a constraint. The literal L0
is called the head of r, and the set {L1, . . . , Ln, not Ln+1, . . . , not Lm} is the body
of r. We use head(r) to denote the head of rule r, and body(r) to denote the body
of r. Furthermore, body+(r) = {L1, . . . , Ln} and body
−(r) = {Ln+1, . . . , Lm}. An
(extended) logic program, or simply a program, is a finite set of rules.
A set of literals X is consistent if it does not contain a complementary pair a,
¬a of literals and does not contain ⊥. We say that X is logically closed iff it is
either consistent or equals L. The smallest set of literals being both logically closed
and closed under a set P of positive rules is denoted by Cn(P ). The reduct, PX ,
of P relative to a set X of literals is defined by PX = {head(r) ← body+(r) |
r ∈ P, body−(r) ∩ X = ∅} (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1990). A set X of literals is an
answer set of a logic program P if Cn(PX) = X . The set of answer sets of program
P is denoted by AS(P ). A program P is consistent just if it has an answer set not
equal to L. Thus a program with no answer sets is also counted as inconsistent.
For example, the program P = {a←, b← a, not c, c← not b} has answer sets
AS(P ) = {{a, b}, {a, c}}.
Two programs P1 and P2 are equivalent, written P1 ≡ P2, if both programs have
the same answer sets. Two programs are strongly equivalent (Lifschitz et al. 2001),
written P1 ≡s P2, just if P1 ∪ P3 ≡ P2 ∪ P3 for every logic program P3.
2.2 Belief revision
Belief revision is the area of KR that is concerned with how an agent may incor-
porate new information about a domain into its knowledge base. In belief revision,
a formula α is to be incorporated into the agent’s set of beliefs K, so that the
resulting knowledge base is consistent when α is. Since α may be inconsistent with
K, revision may also necessitate the removal of beliefs from K in order to retain
consistency. By a principle of informational economy, as many beliefs as possi-
ble are retained from K. A common approach in addressing belief revision is to
provide a set of rationality postulates for belief change functions. The AGM ap-
proach (Alchourro´n et al. 1985; Ga¨rdenfors 1988) provides the best-known set of
such postulates. An agent’s beliefs are modelled by a set of sentences, called a belief
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set, closed under the logical consequence operator of a logic that includes classical
propositional logic.
Subsequently, various researchers have argued that it is more appropriate to
consider epistemic states as objects of revision. An epistemic state K effectively
includes information regarding how the revision function itself changes following
a revision. The belief set corresponding to epistemic state K is denoted Bel(K).
Formally, a revision operator ∗maps an epistemic stateK and new information α to
a revised epistemic state K ∗α. For set of formulas Ψ, define Ψ+α as Cn(Ψ∪{α}).
Then, the basic AGM postulates for revision can be given as follows:
(K ∗ 1) Bel(K ∗ α) = Cn(Bel(K ∗ α))
(K ∗ 2) α ∈ Bel(K ∗ α)
(K ∗ 3) Bel(K ∗ α) ⊆ Bel(K) + α
(K ∗ 4) If ¬α /∈ Bel(K) then Bel(K) + α ⊆ Bel(K ∗ α)
(K ∗ 5) Bel(K ∗ α) is inconsistent, only if ⊢ ¬α
(K ∗ 6) If α ≡ ψ then Bel(K ∗ α) = Bel(K ∗ ψ)
Thus, the result of revising K by α is an epistemic state in which α is believed in
the corresponding belief set (K ∗ 1, K ∗ 2); whenever the result is consistent, the
revised belief set consists of the expansion of Bel(K) by α (K ∗ 3, K ∗ 4); the only
time that Bel(K) is inconsistent is when α is inconsistent (K ∗ 5); and revision is
independent of the syntactic form of the formula for revision (K ∗6). (As well, there
are two extended postulates (K ∗ 7) and (K ∗ 8) that extend (K ∗ 3) and (K ∗ 4) to
relating revision by a conjunction and the individual conjuncts. Like (K ∗ 3) and
(K ∗ 4) they are are not appropriate in a nonmonotonic framework (below) and we
do not consider them further.)
Belief revision is usually expressed with respect to an underlying logic governed by
a Tarskian consequence operator. It can be observed that two of the postulates, (K∗
3) and (K ∗4), are inappropriate in a system governed by a notion of nonmonotonic
consequence. As an example, consider where the agent believes that a particular
individual is a bird and that it can fly. If it is subsequently learned that the bird was
a penguin, the agent would also modify its knowledge base so that it believed that
the individual did not fly. This example then violates both (K ∗3) and (K ∗4). Note
that we can’t circumvent this counterexample by simply excluding states of affairs
where there are no flying penguins, since we would want to allow the possibility
that a penguin (perhaps an extremely fit penguin) flies, even though penguins, by
default, do not fly. In consequence we focus on postulates (K ∗ 1), (K ∗ 2), (K ∗ 5)
and (K ∗ 6), which we refer to as the core AGM postulates.
Note that nonmonotonic formalisms can nonetheless be treated from the stand-
point of classical (AGM) revision; the issue is to express revision in terms of a mono-
tonic foundation. Thus (Delgrande et al. 2008) addresses revision in ASP from the
standpoint of the SE models of a program. This is in contrast to the work here, and
previous work, which addresses belief change at the level of a logic program rather
than with respect to the underlying models.
Various revision operators have been defined; see (Satoh 1988; Williams 1995;
Delgrande and Schaub 2003) for representative approaches. Perhaps the best known
Logic Program Revision 5
approach is the Dalal revision operator (Dalal 1988). This operator is defined as
follows. Let ψ, µ be formulas of propositional logic, and let ⊖ be the symmetric dif-
ference of two sets. Then the Dalal revision ψ ∗d µ is characterised by those models
of µ that are closest to models of ψ, where the notion of closeness is given by the
Hamming distance between interpretations. Formally, ψ ∗d µ, is defined as follows.
For formulas α and β, define:
|⊖|min(α, β)
def
= min≤({|w ⊖ w
′| | w ∈ Mod(α), w′ ∈ Mod(β)}).
Then, Mod(ψ ∗d µ) is given as
{w ∈ Mod(µ) | ∃w′∈Mod(ψ) s.t. |w ⊖ w′| = |⊖|min(ψ, µ)}.
2.3 Logic Program Updates
Previous work in ASP that addresses an agent’s evolving knowledge base has gener-
ally been termed logic program update or update logic programs. In such approaches
one begins with an ordered logic program, comprised of a sequence of logic programs
(P1, . . . , Pn). Rules in higher-ranked sets are, in some fashion or another, preferred
over those in lower-ranked sets. Commonly this is implemented by using the order-
ing on rules to adjudicate which of two rules should be applied when both are appli-
cable and their respective heads conflict; see for example (Inoue and Sakama 1999;
Alferes et al. 2000; Eiter et al. 2002). Alternatively, other approaches use the order-
ing to “filter” rules, e.g. (Zhang and Foo 1998). Hence, in one fashion or another,
some rules are selected over others, and these selected rules are used to determine
the resulting answer sets.
A major stream of research in ASP has addressed prioritised or preference logic
programs, where a prioritised logic program is a pair (P,<) in which < is an or-
dering over rules in program P . The intuition is that some rules take precedence
over (or override or are more important than) other rules. Syntactically, the form
of an update logic program, given as a total order on programs, is of course an
instance of a prioritised logic program. We suggest that an update logic program
is in fact best regarded as a prioritised logic program. (Indeed some approaches
to updating logic programs are defined in terms of a prioritised logic program
(Foo and Zhang 1997; Zhang and Foo 1998).) This is most clearly seen in those
approaches where the focus is on rules whose heads conflict. Thus, for example in
the approach of (Eiter et al. 2002), preferences come into play only between two
rules when the head of one is the complementary literal of the other. The following
example, due to Patrick Kru¨mpelmann, is illuminating:
P1 = {b←}, P2 = {¬a← b}, P3 = {a←}
In update logic programs, the rule in P2 is dropped, since its head conflicts with
the higher-ranked rule in P3. Yet dropping the rule in P1 yields a consistent result.
Moreover, since it is the lowest-ranked rule, arguably it should be disregarded.
We can summarise the preceding by suggesting that previous work is essentially
based at the rule level, in that higher-ranked rules preempt lower-ranked rules. In
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contrast, the approach here is based at the program level ; that is for a revision
P1 ∗ P2, the program P2 is considered as a whole to have priority over P1, in that
program P2’s answer sets in a sense have priority over those of P1. This is effected
in a revision P1 ∗P2 by first determining answer sets of P2, and then augmenting, as
appropriate, these answer sets with additional information via P1. (There is more to
it than this, as described in the next section. For example, rules in P1 may result in
other rules in P2 being applied. However the essential point remains, that the answer
sets of P1 are first determined, and then subsequently augmented.) Arguably this is
the appropriate level of granularity for revision: If an agent learns new information
given in a program P , it is the program as a whole that comprises the agent’s (new)
knowledge. That is, a rule r ∈ P isn’t an isolated piece of knowledge, but rather,
given possible negation as failure literals in body(r), the potential instantiation of
r depends non-locally on the entire program P .
(Eiter et al. 2002) suggests a number of alternative postulates that may be con-
sidered for update program updates. For our use, they are given as follows:
Initialisation: AS(∅ ∗ P ) = AS (P ).
Idempotency: AS(P ∗ P ) = AS(P ).
Tautology: If head(r) ∈ body+(r), for all r ∈ P2, then
AS(P1 ∗ P2) = AS (P1).
Associativity: AS(P1 ∗ (P2 ∗ P3)) = AS((P1 ∗ P2) ∗ P3).
Absorption: if AS (P2) = AS (P3) then AS(P1 ∗ P2 ∗ P3) = AS(P1 ∗ P2).
Augmentation: If AS(P2) ⊆ AS (P3), then AS(P1 ∗ P2 ∗ P3) = AS(P1 ∗ P3).
Disjointness: If atom(P1) ∩ atom(P2) = ∅, then
AS((P1 ∪ P2) ∗ P3) = AS(P1 ∗ P3) ∪ AS (P2 ∗ P3).
Parallelism: If atom(P2) ∩ atom(P3) = ∅, then
AS(P1 ∗ (P2 ∪ P3)) = AS(P1 ∗ P2) ∪ AS (P1 ∗ P3).
Non-Interference: If atom(P2) ∩ atom(P3) = ∅, then
AS(P1 ∗ P2 ∗ P3) = AS (P1 ∗ P3 ∗ P2).
Many of these postulates are elementary and expected, yet most extant approaches
have problems with them. In particular, most approaches do not satisfy tautology
and so for instance the addition of a rule p← p may produce different results. More-
over, those that do satisfy tautology most often do so by specifically addressing this
principle. It seems reasonable to suggest that the reason for this lack of adherence
to basic postulates is that belief change with respect to ASP is a program-level
operation, and not a rule-level operation.
3 Logic Program Revision: Intuitions
The overall goal is to come up with an approach to revision in logic programs (call
it LP revision) under the answer set semantics, where the approach adheres insofar
as possible to intuitions underlying classical (AGM) revision. In essence, a major
goal is to examine the extent to which the AGM approach may be applied with
respect to answer set programming. As described earlier, we take a logic program
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P as specifying an agent’s epistemic state. The answer sets of P , AS(P ), represent
the beliefs of the agent, and so are analogous to a belief set in AGM revision.
A key characteristic of AGM revision, and one that guides the approach here,
is the success postulate. Recall that in the AGM approach, the success postulate
stipulates that α ∈ Bel(K ∗ α), or in terms of models, that Mod(Bel(K ∗ α)) ⊆
Mod(α). Informally, in a revision by α, the logical content of α is retained. By
analogy with the success postulate, for a revision of P1 by P2, the content of P2 is
given by its answer sets, and so in the revision P1 ∗P2, the answer sets of P2 should
in some sense be contained in those of P1 ∗P2. This notion is fundamental; as well,
it has very significant ramifications in an approach to LP revision.
For example, consider the following programs, where we want to determine P1∗P2:
Example 3.1
P1 = {b←, c← not d}
P2 = {a← not b}
By our interpretation of the success postulate, since {a} is an answer set of P2,
it should appear in the answer sets of P1 ∗ P2 (that is, {a} should be a subset of
some answer set of P1 ∗ P2). However, a was derived by the failure of being able
to prove b in P1. Consequently, if the answer sets of P2 are to appear among the
answer sets of P1 ∗ P2, then the reasons for the answer sets of P2 should also be
retained. Consequently b should not appear in the answer sets of P1 ∗ P2. Hence
we would want to obtain {a, c} as the answer set of P1 ∗ P2. This example serves
to distinguish the present approach from previous work, in that in previous work
the assertion of a fact overrides an assumption of negation as failure at any level.
Thus in previous work on update logic programs for the above example one would
obtain the answer set {b, c}.
So adherence to a success postulate requires that, if a literal not p is used in a
higher-ranked set of rules, it should override positive occurrences in lower-ranked
sets. This also is in keeping with our assertion in the previous section, that in a
revision we consider a program as a whole, and not at the individual rule level.
However, it might plausibly be objected that often one wants to retain facts (such
as b in P1), and so such facts should obtain in the revision P1 ∗ P2. We suggest
instead that in such an instance, such (protected) facts should in fact be given
higher priority. We return to this point in Section 5, where we discuss the notion
of a revision methodology.
In working towards an answer set for a revision P1 ∗ P2, we first determine an
answer set for P2. However, we need to keep track of not just those literals that are
(positively) derivable, but also a set of not literals necessary for the construction
of the answer set. Consequently, we deal with three-valued answer sets. Thus for
Example 3.1, in considering P1, we need to keep track of the fact that a was derived
in P2 and that moreover not b was used in this derivation, thereby necessitating
the blocking of any later deriving of b in lower ranked rule sets. We write the three
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valued answer set of P2 in Example 3.1 as ({a}, {b}). The three value answer set
for P1 ∗ P2 then is ({a, c}, {b, d}); and the corresponding answer set for P1 ∗ P2 is
{a, c}.
Consider next a variation of Example 3.1 where again we are to determine answer
sets for P1 ∗ P2:
Example 3.2
P1 = {b←, c← not d}
P2 = {a← not b, a← not e}
The atom a may be obtained by not b or not c in P2. By appeal to a principle
of informational economy (Section 2), in a three valued answer set we retain a
minimum number of not literals sufficient to derive the answer set. This commitment
to a minimum number of not literals in turn means that there are fewer restrictions
when next considering P1. In the present example, this means that P2 has two
three-valued answer sets: ({a}, {b}) and ({a}, {c}). This leads to the three valued
answer sets for P1 ∗P2: ({a, c}, {b}) and ({a, b}, {c}); and corresponding answer sets
{a, c} and {a, b}.
Consider finally the programs:
Example 3.3
P1 = {b←}
P2 = {a← b}
P2 has answer set ∅ (and three-value answer set (∅, ∅)). However in next considering
P1 in the revision P1 ∗ P2, one should be able to use the non-satisfied rule a ← b
and obtain an answer set {a, b} for P1 ∗ P2. This is by way of an extended notion
of informational economy, in which a maximal justifiable set of beliefs is desirable.
So rules of P2 that are neither applied nor refuted should nonetheless be available
for later steps in the revision.
These examples have dealt with a single occurrence of revision. Clearly the pro-
cess can be iterated to a sequence of programs. Informally, an answer set for a
sequence of programs is determined by finding 3-valued answer sets for higher-
ranked programs, and propagating these answer sets, along with undecided rules,
to lower ranked programs. Consequently, answer sets are built incrementally, with
literals at a higher level being retained at lower levels. In the next subsection, for
generality, we work with sequences of programs rather than just pairs.
4 Logic Program Revision: Approach
This section describes an approach to LP revision based on the intuitions of the
previous subsection. Consider by way of analogy, classical AGM revision: For a
revision K ∗ α, the formula α is to be incorporated in K; since Bel(K) ∪ {α}
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may well be inconsistent, formulas in Bel(K) may be dropped in order to obtain
a consistent result. Similarly in a revision of programs P1 ∗ P2: we would like the
result to be consistent if possible.
In outline, the goal is to determine answer sets for P1 ∗P2. To this end, an answer
set X of P2 is determined and it, along with the rules in P2, say P
′
2, that do not
take part in the definition of X , are propagated to P1. Since the result should
be consistent, we consider maximal subsets of P1 that are consistent with P
′
2 ∪X
and use these to determine the resulting answer sets for the revision. We begin by
defining the relevant notion of an answer set with respect to revision.
By a three-valued interpretation we will mean an ordered pair of sets X =
(X+, X−) where X+, X− ⊆ L and X+ ∩ X− = ∅. The intuition is that mem-
bers of X+ constitute an answer set of some program, while X− contains a mini-
mum set of assumptions necessary for the derivation of X+. A (canonical) program
corresponding to a 3-valued interpretation X = (X+, X−) is given by
Pgm(X) = {a← | a ∈ X+} ∪ {⊥ ← a | a ∈ X−}.
The consequence relation Cn(.) on definite programs is extended to arbitrary logic
programs by the simple expedient of treating a weakly negated literal not l as a
new atom. Thus for example Cn({a←, b← a, c← not d}) is {a, b}.
The next definition extends the notion of reduct to 3-valued interpretations.
Definition 4.1
Let P be a logic program and X = (X+, X−) a 3-valued interpretation.
PX , the min-reduct of P wrt X , is the program obtained from P by:
1. deleting every rule r ∈ P where body−(r) ∩X+ 6= ∅, and
2. replacing any remaining rule r ∈ P by
head(r)← body+(r), not(body−(r) \X−).
Part 1 above is the same as in the standard definition of reduct. In Part 2, just those
naf literals appearing in X− are deleted from the bodies of the remaining rules. The
following definition extends the notion of an answer set to 3-valued answer sets.
Definition 4.2
Let P be a logic program and X = (X+, X−) a 3-valued interpretation.
X = (X+, X−) is a 3-valued answer set for P if Cn(PX
+
) = Cn(PX) = X+
and for any Y = (X+, Y −) where Y − ⊂ X− we have that Cn(P Y ) 6= X+.
The set of 3-valued answer sets of program P is denoted 3AS (P ).
Thus for 3-valued answer set X = (X+, X−) of P , we have that X+ is an answer
set of P . As well, 3-valued answer sets include sufficient negation as failure literals
for the derivation of the answer set. Thus, for {a ← not b, a ← not c} there are
two 3-valued answer sets ({a}, {b}) and ({a}, {c}) along with answer set {a}.
As suggested at the start of the section, in a revision P1 ∗ P2 we need to isolate
a subset of P1 that is consistent with P2. We give the necessary definition next.
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Definition 4.3
Let P1, P2 be logic programs. Define P1 ↓P2 by:
If P2 is not consistent, then P1 ↓P2 = L.
Otherwise:
P1 ↓P2 = {P
′ ∪ P2 | P
′ ⊆ P1 and P
′ ∪ P2 is consistent and
for P ′ ⊂ P ′′ ⊆ P1, P
′′ ∪ P2 is inconsistent.}
Thus for P ∈ P1 ↓P2, P consists of P2 together with a maximal set of rules from
P1 such that P is consistent.
Given a sequence of logic programs (P1, . . . , Pn), the revision process can now be
informally described as follows:
1. Let Xn ∈ 3AS (Pn); that is, Xn = (X+n , X
−
n ) is a 3-valued answer set for Pn.
2. In the general case, one has a 3-valued answer set Xi+1 = (X
+
i+1, X
−
i+1) from
the revision sequence (Pi+1, . . . , Pn). A maximal set of rules in (Pi, . . . , Pn)
consistent withXi+1 is used to determine a 3-valued answer setXi = (X
+
i , X
−
i )
for the revision sequence (Pi, . . . , Pn).
3. A 3-valued answer set X1 = (X
+
1 , X
−
1 ) for the revision sequence (P1, . . . , Pn)
then yields the answer set X+1 for the full sequence (P1, . . . , Pn).
With this setting, we can give the main definition for the answer sets of a revi-
sion sequence of programs. To this end, a revision problem is given by a sequence
(P1, . . . , Pn) of logic programs; the goal is to determine answer sets of the sequence
under the interpretation that a higher-indexed program, taken as a single entity,
takes priority over a lower-indexed program. We write the revision sequence in no-
tation closer to that of standard belief revision, as P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn; our goal then is to
characterise the answer sets of P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn.
Definition 4.4
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a sequence of logic programs.
X is an answer set of P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn iff there is a sequence:
((P r1 , X1), . . . , (P
r
n , Xn))
such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P ri is a logic program and Xi is a 3-valued interpretation,
and:
1. i.) P rn = Pn and
ii.) Xn is a 3-valued answer set for Pn.
2. for i < n:
i.) P ri ∈ Pi ↓(P
r
i+1 ∪ Pgm(Xi+1)) and
ii.) Xi is a 3-valued answer set for P
r
i .
3. X = X+1 .
The set of answer sets of P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn is denoted AS(P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn).
The case of binary revision is of course simpler. Though redundant, it is instruc-
tive, and so we give it next.
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Definition 4.5
Let P1, P2 be logic programs. X is an answer set of P1 ∗ P2 if:
1. there is a 3-valued answer set X2 of P2 and,
2. for some P ∈ P1 ↓(P2 ∪ Pgm(X2)), X is an answer set of P .
4.1 Examples
Consider the examples given earlier. For Example 3.1 we have:
P1 = {b←, c← not d}
P2 = {a← not b}
For P1 ∗ P2 we obtain:
P r2 = P2, X2 = ({a}, {b})
P r1 = {c← not d} ∪ {a←, ⊥ ← b}, X1 = ({a, c}, {b, d}).
Thus, P2 has 3-valued answer set ({a}, {b}) – {a} is a (standard) answer set for P2,
and it depends on, at minimum, the assumption of b being false by default. This
in turn requires a commitment to the non-truth of b in next considering P1. The
program P r1 given by rules of P1 consistent with ({a}, {b}) consists of the single
rule c ← not d along with an encoding of the 3-valued interpretation ({a}, {b}).
We obtain the 3-valued answer set ({a, c}, {b, d}), with corresponding answer set
{a, c}. This shows that a fact, in this case b, may be withdrawn without its negation
¬b being asserted. We elaborate on this point in the context of an overall revision
methodology in Section 5.
Consider next Example 3.2:
P1 = {b←, c←}
P2 = {a← not b, a← not c}
P2 has two 3-valued answer sets ({a}, {b}) and ({a}, {c}). Again, {a} is a (standard)
answer set for P2, but it depends on, at minimum, the assumption of either b or c
being false by default. This in turn requires a commitment to the falsity of one of b
or c in next considering P1. As a result, the 3-valued answer set ({a}, {b}) yields the
program P r1 given by {c←, a←, ⊥ ← b}, while the 3-valued answer set ({a}, {c})
yields the program {b ←, a ←, ⊥ ← c}. Consequently for the revision we obtain
two 3-valued answer sets ({a, c}, {b}) and ({a, b}, {c}), with corresponding answer
sets {a, c} and {a, b}.
For Example 3.3, where P1 = {b←} and P2 = {a← b}, we obtain:
P r2 = P2, X2 = (∅, ∅)
P r1 = {b←} ∪ {a← b}, X1 = ({a, b}, {}).
Thus there is one 3-valued answer set, ({a, b}, ∅), with answer set {a, b}.
We consider two more small examples to further illustrate the approach.
P1 = {a←, b←}
P2 = {⊥ ← a, b}
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For P1 ∗P2, there are two 3-valued answer sets, ({a}, ∅), ({b}, ∅) with corresponding
answer sets {a}, {b}. This is what would be desired: P2 requires that a and b cannot
be simultaneously true, while P1 states that a and b are both true. In this case, P2
is retained, with a “maximal” part of P1 also held. Last, consider:
P1 = {a←, d← b}
P2 = {b← not a, c← not ¬a}
In this case, P2 has three-valued answer set ({b, c}, {a,¬a}); hence the derivation
of b and c relies on the possibility of a being true, and of a being false. There is one
3-valued answer set for P1 ∗ P2, ({b, c, d}, {a,¬a}), with answer set {b, c, d}.
4.2 Properties
Section 2.2 noted that four of the basic AGM postulates are appropriate in a non-
monotonic framework. With respect to these postulates, we obtain the following:
Theorem 4.1
Let P1, P2, P3 be logic programs.
(A ∗ 1) AS(P1 ∗ P2) ⊆ 2L.
(A ∗ 2) If X ∈ AS(P2) then there is X ′ ∈ AS(P1 ∗ P2) such that X ⊆ X ′.
(A ∗ 5a) AS(P1 ∗ P2) = L iff AS(P2) = L
(A ∗ 5b) AS (P1 ∗ P2) = ∅ iff AS(P2) = ∅
(A ∗ 6) If P2 ≡s P3 then AS(P1 ∗ P2) = AS(P1 ∗ P3).
Proof
(A ∗ 1) is a direct consequence of Definition 4.5. (A ∗ 2) follows from the fact
that if X ∈ AS (P2) then there is a three-valued answer set (X,Y ) ∈ 3AS (P2),
and that P1 ↓ (P2 ∪ Pgm((X,Y ))) by definition has an answer set. Similarly, for
(A ∗ 5a) we have that if AS (P2) = L then AS(P1 ∗ P2) = L, and if AS(P2) 6= L
then AS (P1 ∗ P2) 6= L, both following directly from Definition 4.3. (A ∗ 5b) follows
analogously.
For (A ∗ 6) we have, in outline: By assumption we have that P2 ≡s P3, and
so for any program R, P2 ∪ R ≡s P3 ∪ R. In particular, let X ∈ 3AS (P2). Then
P2 ∪ Pgm(X) ≡s P3 ∪ Pgm(X).
We next make use of the small result: If P ≡s P
′ then for program R and
S ∈ R ↓ P we have that there is S′ ∈ R ↓ P ′ such that AS (S) = AS(S′). The
proof of this claim is straightforward: Let S ∈ R↓P . S is of the form R′ ∪P where
R′ ⊆ R. We have that R′ ∪ P ≡s R′ ∪ P ′ since P ≡s P ′. So for S′ = R′ ∪ P ′ we
have that S′ ∈ R↓P ′; as well, S ≡s S′ and so AS(S) = AS (S′).
So, consider again X ∈ 3AS(P2). We have that P2 ∪ Pgm(X) ≡s P3 ∪ Pgm(X)
and so, applying the above small result we have that for S ∈ P1 ↓ (P2 ∪ Pgm(X))
there is S′ ∈ P1 ↓(P3∪Pgm(X)), such that AS(S) = AS (S′), and so if follows that
AS(P1 ∗ P2) = AS(P1 ∗ P3).
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Thus the result of revision is a set of answer sets (A ∗ 1), which is to say, if
an agent’s beliefs are given by a set of answer sets corresponding to potential
states of the world, then a revision sequence also yields a set of such beliefs. The
key property of the approach is given by (A ∗ 2), corresponding to the success
postulate: in a revision P1 ∗ P2, beliefs as expressed in P2 override those of P1.
The two parts of (A ∗ 5) hold by virtue of the fact that in a revision P1 ∗ P2,
only some consistent (with P2) subset of P1 is used in the revision. (A ∗ 6) is
a version of independence of syntax. The postulate fails if P2 ≡s P3 is replaced
by P2 ≡u P3 or AS(P2) = AS(P3): a counterexample is given by P1 = {b ←},
P2 = {a ← not b}, and P3 = {a ← not c}. Consequently, appropriate versions of
the core AGM postulates hold in the approach.
With regards to the postulates given in Section 2.3 for logic program updates,
we obtain the following.
Theorem 4.2
Let P1, P2, P3 be logic programs.
Then P1, P2, P3 satisfy initialisation, idempotency, and non-interference.
As well, we obtain:
SAbsorption: if P2 ≡s P3 then AS (P1 ∗ P2 ∗ P3) = AS (P1 ∗ P2).
These principles are elementary but nonetheless desirable. As mentioned, most ap-
proaches to update logic programs fail to satisfy tautology, and in fact they generally
do so when a revised program is inconsistent. The present approach also fails to
satisfy tautology, and in the same situation, but in this case the lack of this princi-
ple is intended: tautology is incompatible with (A ∗ 5) and (A ∗ 6) in the case that
the revised program is inconsistent. Note that it is straightforward to modify the
approach so that tautology is satisfied, at the expense of (A ∗ 5) and (A ∗ 6), by the
simple expedient of modifying Definition 4.5, Part 2, to be
2. X is an answer set for P1 ∪ P2 ∪ Pgm(X2).
The remaining principles listed in Section 2 can be argued to be undesirable,
with the possible exception of associativity. Not surprisingly, absorption fails at the
level of answer sets, though not at the level of strong equivalence (as given by SAb-
sorption). Augmentation would seem to be related to a notion of monotonicity,
and hence is undesirable. Disjointness and parallelism both clearly fail. Arguably
both should fail; consider the the case where P2 = ∅. Disjointness in this situation
reduces to:
AS (P1 ∗ P3) = AS (P1 ∗ P3) ∪ AS(P3)
which is clearly undesirable.
Implementation A prototype implementation has been written in C (Tasharrofi 2009),
and making use of the solver clasp (Gebser et al. 2007). The prototype is at an
early stage of development, and results concerning benchmarks or scalability have
not yet been obtained.
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5 Discussion
This paper has described an approach to logic program revision in which the focus
is on revision as understood in the belief revision community. Consequently, the key
success postulate is taken seriously. The intuition is that a logic program represents
an agent’s epistemic state, while the answer sets are a representation of the agent’s
contingent beliefs. This leads to an approach with quite different properties than
other approaches that have appeared in the literature. In particular, for a revision
P1 ∗ P2 the program P2 is treated as a whole as having higher priority than P1, in
that answer sets of P2 are propagated to P1. This has an important consequence,
and requires the use of three-valued interpretations, in that literals assumed to be
false at a higher ranked program can override literals used as facts in a lower-ranked
program. This is in contrast to logic program update, where one selects rules to
apply, giving preference to rules in P2, and then applies these selected rules.
Arguably the approach helps cast light on the logic-program-update landscape.
We have suggested that update logic program approaches are more appropriately
viewed as dealing with preferences or priorities over rules, rather than revision or
update per se. The approach at hand seems to fall somewhere between a syntactic
approach and a semantic one, such as (Delgrande et al. 2008). The answer sets
obtained exhibit reasonable properties – for example, the core AGM postulates are
satisfied, including syntax independence under strong equivalence and a success
postulate; and the appropriate set of logic program update postulates are also
satisfied. The approach would seem to have some hope for practical implementation.
A prototype implementation is available. At present it is essentially a “proof of
concept” and is a subject of current investigation.
Applicability and Evaluation of the Approach As indicated in the introduction, a
primary aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which classical notions of
belief revision may be applied in revising logic programs under the answer set se-
mantics. We have claimed that the approach is intuitive, in that it reflects plausible
notions concerning revision. In contrast to related work, it satisfies a suite of desir-
able formal properties. On the other hand, as with belief revision in classical logic,
there is not necessarily a single best approach to logic program revision, but rather
different approaches will be more or less suitable in different areas. To this end we
can consider circumstances in which the present approach would be applicable.
It would be applicable, clearly, in a problem in which the answer sets of more
recent programs are to hold sway over the answer sets of lower-ranked programs.
This would be the case with program refinement for example, where elaborations
taking care of special cases are incorporated into an existing program. As well, the
approach can be directly applied to problems involving a sequence of NP complete
problems, for example in a situation where the solution to one problem feeds as
input into a second. A representative example described earlier involves finding a
three colouring for a graph, and then finding a Hamiltonian path on the vertices of
a specific colour.
These considerations also suggest the following revision methodology. A logic
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program will most often be comprised of two parts, a problem instance consisting
of facts, and a problem description consisting of rules with variables. Typically the
facts will be of highest importance – thus in the example of finding a Hamiltonian
path among yellow-coloured vertices, one would not want to revise the underlying
graph. Hence any approach to logic program change will want to isolate portions of
the knowledge base (usually the problem instance) as being incontrovertible. It is a
strength of the present approach that this can already be effected in an application,
since if the facts are given as the first revising program in a sequence, the success
postulate guarantees that the facts will not be modified.
Future work There has been little work on logic program change with respect to
disjunctive logic programs. A major reason for this is that most approaches to up-
date logic programs focus on rules with conflicting heads. In a disjunctive program,
it is not immediately clear what it means for two rules to have conflicting heads.
Consequently it isn’t obvious how approaches to update logic programs can be ex-
tended to deal with disjunction in the head. An obvious extension to the present
approach then is to apply it to disjunctive programs. The key issue is to extend the
definition of a three-valued interpretation to disjunctive rules. There seems to be no
barrier to such an extension, and this would seem to be a useful yet (presumably)
straightforward extension.
A more difficult problem is to define revision so that the result of a revision is
a single logic program expressed in the language of the revising programs. That
is, intuitively and ideally, the result of P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn should be a logic program P ,
expressed in the language atom(P1) ∪ . . . ∪ atom(Pn). (That is, auxiliary atoms
would be expressly forbidden.) Arguably this is the real problem of revision in
logic programs, and there has been no substantial progress in this area due to its
difficulty. The present approach may allow insight into how such an approach to
revision can be carried out. In fact, it already allows the formation of single logic
program that can be considered as a candidate for the revision P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn. We
have the result:
Theorem 5.1
Given the assumptions and terms of Definition 4.4 where (X+
1
, X−
1
) is a 3-valued
answer set of P1 ∗ . . .∗Pn we have that: X
+
1 is an answer set of P
r
1 ∪P
r
2 ∪ . . .∪P
r
n .
Note that P rn = Pn and so the highest-ranked program is retained, along with other
rules from remaining programs that aren’t excluded by higher-ranked programs.
Hence, we can use the approach to obtain a single program from a sequence of
programs. However, this is a weak result, since the above result guarantees only
that a single answer set of Pn will be retained in the program resulting from the
revision P1 ∗ . . . ∗ Pn. Hence one obtains a very credulous revision operator, in
that many potential answer sets are ruled out. It may be that the set of programs
obtained according to Theorem 5.1 can be merged into a single program, but this
task in turn requires a nuanced approach to merging logic programs.
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